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I. INTRODUCTION
Several studies try to explain case outcomes based on the politics of
judicial selection methods.' Scholars usually hypothesize that judges se-
lected by partisan popular elections are subject to greater political pressure
in deciding cases than are other judges. No class of cases seems more
amenable to such analysis than death penalty cases. Indeed, strong anec-
dotal evidence suggests a relation between the politics of selection meth-
ods and death penalty appeal outcomes. For example, electoral removals
of Chief Justice Rose Bird in California and Justice Penny White in Ten-
nessee were directly linked to decisions in capital cases. 2 A 1980s study,
moreover, suggests that states' judicial selection methods correlate with
capital appeal outcomes.3 Thus, one expects judges who must face voters
to be more reluctant to overturn death sentences.
1. See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-
SUPREME-COURT POLICY (1996); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from
Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat,
What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (1979); F. Andrew Hans-
sen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus
Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1999).
2. See John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A. J. 50, Nov. 1996, at 50,51; Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 345,444-45 & n.462 (1998); Stephen B. Bright,
Hanging the Judge; Demagogues, Politicians Chip Away at U.S. Court System, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June
8, 1997, at HI; Maura Dolan, Rose Bird's Quest for Obscurity, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al. See
also infra text accompanying notes 13-18, 25-28.
3. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Elected Judiciary, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 170, 171 (Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst & John G. West, Jr. eds., Stipp. 1 1992).
This study shows meaningful differences between judges selected by executive appointment compared
[Vol. 72:465
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No study, however, accounts both for judicial politics and case selec-
tion, the process through which cases are selected for death penalty litiga-
tion. Yet, the case selection process cannot be ignored because it yields a
set of cases for adjudication that is far from a random selection of cases.4
Effects based on judicial selection politics can only reliably be detected if
one accounts for this filtering of cases judges adjudicate. 5
In death penalty litigation, the case filtering process begins with the
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty. Some prosecutors are said
to do so in virtually every case that arguably satisfies their state's criteria
for possible imposition of the death penalty.6 Others exercise substantially
more discretion.7 These differences should lead to interstate variation in
the death-worthiness of cases trial courts adjudicate. Consider two prose-
cutors: One prosecutor only seeks the death penalty in cases involving de-
fendants who have been previously convicted of murder, were released,
and subsequently murder again. The second prosecutor seeks death in
every possible death-eligible case. While acknowledging the difficulty
attending any formal definition of "death-worthiness," we expect the first
prosecutor's collection of capital cases to be, on average, more death-
worthy than the second prosecutor's collection of capital cases.
The case filtering process affecting reviewing courts' case mix con-
tinues at the adjudicatory stage. The trial adjudicator, either the judge or
the jury, may cushion the effect of extreme prosecutorial death-seeking
behavior. Prosecutors may seek death, but the adjudicator need not impose
it. So the most extreme variations in death-seeking behavior likely fade by
the time reviewing courts address the residue of appealed death penalty
cases. Indeed, the adjudicators themselves may skew the reviewing
with judges selected by other methods, such as elections. But it shows no substantial differences be-
tween judges selected within the various election methods.
4. See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selec-
tion and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92 (1997) (analyzing case selection process).
5. See Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary:
The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995) (accounting
for assignment of cases); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Cir-
cuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (same).
6. See Tina Rosenberg, Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 20
(noting that Philadelphia's district attorney "seeks death virtually as often as the law will allow.").
But see David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara Brof-
fitt, Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1677 tbl.1 (1998)
(showing that death is not sought in all death-eligible cases in Philadelphia).
7. For evidence of intrastate variation in prosecutorial death-seeking behavior in Georgia, see
DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WVOODSWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY 120, 122, 125 (1990).
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courts' case mix. Given prosecutors with the same death-seeking behav-
ior, more death-prone adjudicators will present reviewing courts with a
different mix of death penalty cases than less death-prone adjudicators.
The combined effects of prosecutors' and adjudicators' behavior need not
lead to imposing the death penalty in equally death-worthy cases across
states. And, in fact, we find that states obtain the death penalty at widely
varying rates.
Variation in the rates at which prosecutors seek death penalties and
adjudicators impose them thus ought to influence the rate at which review-
ing courts overturn capital sentences. In the extreme, a state in which
prosecutors seek and obtain the death penalty in every possible case will,
on average, submit for judicial review a class of cases that is less death-
worthy than a state in which prosecutors seek or obtain the death penalty
only in the most egregious of the eligible cases. The group of less death-
worthy cases ought to be subject to more frequent reversal than a more se-
lectively filtered group of cases.
In theory, case selection could frustrate efforts to detect political ef-
fects. Life-tenured, fully independent judges may challenge death sen-
tences infrequently because they serve in a jurisdiction in which prosecu-
tors and adjudicators are highly selective about the cases in which they
seek and impose death. Conversely, judges selected in highly partisan
elections may reverse a significantly higher number of death sentences be-
cause prosecutors and adjudicators in their jurisdiction show little restraint
in seeking and imposing the death penalty. Detecting the effect of judicial
selection politics occurs against this background of case selection and must
account for it.
Two aspects of the impact of judicial selection politics are worth
separating. The first focuses on interstate differences in death penalty case
processing. Methods of state judicial selection are believed to correlate
with death penalty outcomes. The more independent the state's judiciary,
the more likely the judiciary is to scrutinize death sentences without fear of
reprisal. A second aspect of judicial selection politics relates to possible
differences between state and federal judges. Unlike most state judges,
federal judges are independent of the electoral process. Whether or not
interstate differences exist in capital case processing, we might expect fed-
eral judges to be more willing to question death sentences than state
judges.
This Article uses two databases to explore factors affecting grants of
relief from death penalties. The first consists of approximately 800 ap-
peals of death sentences decided from 1995 to 1997. It consists solely of
[Vol. 72:465
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direct appeals in capital cases and is limited to state courts. The second
database is the Bureau of Justice Statistics' ("BJS") database of all persons
sentenced to death from 1973 to 1995.8 It includes information about
whether a defendant obtained relief from a death sentence and includes
post-conviction relief. The source of relief could be federal or state court
but the database does not reveal which court system acted to grant relief.
Accounting for case selection, as measured by states' rates of obtain-
ing death penalties in murder cases, helps explain the pattern of relief from
death sentences in the BJS data. The rate at which states impose sentences
strongly correlates with the rate at which relief was obtained from those
sentences. But case selection does not help explain the pattern of reversals
in state court death penalty appeals from 1995 to 1997. That is, we find no
correlation between states' rates of obtaining death penalties and state
courts' reversing capital convictions or sentences.
Furthermore, we find little evidence that states' methods of selecting
judges correlates with outcomes of death penalty cases. The first aspect of
judicial selection politics, interstate variation in relief from death sen-
tences, does not depend on mode of judicial selection. The absence of
such a correlation holds whether or not one accounts for case selection.9
And the absence of correlation holds for both the BJS data and the state
court appellate case data.
Although we find no system-wide evidence of the effect of state ju-
dicial election methods on case outcomes, developments in individual
states do confirm the death penalty's politically charged character. But the
pattern of challenges to individual state justices and the responses mani-
fested in subsequent death penalty adjudication are not readily explained
by the conventional belief that justices are most vulnerable in states with
partisan judicial elections. For example, California is generally not classi-
fied as a state with partisan judicial elections. Yet death penalty politics
played a major role in reconstituting the California Supreme Court. 10 So
interstate differences in death penalty case processing are not readily ex-
plicable by judicial selection methods.
8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1973-1995 (Inter-Univ. Consortium for Pol. and Soc. Research No. 6956, 1997)
[hereinafter BJS]. Although the BJS data include federal capital defendants, we exclude them from
the analysis.
9. But we obtain a significant negative correlation between partisan judicial elections and re-
versals when we recharacterize Ohio from a nonpartisan election state to a partisan election state.
Excluding Ohio, there is not even a near-significant difference. See infra text accompanying notes 73-
77.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 25-29.
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We find indirect evidence that the federal judiciary processes death
penalty cases differently than state courts. The correlation in the BJS data
between states' death-obtaining behavior and relief from death penalties
suggests that death penalty decisionmaking that includes the federal judi-
ciary reflects differences in the underlying death-worthiness of cases. The
absence of such a correlation in the state court appellate data could be in-
terpreted as evidence of pressure to affirm death penalty cases with less
attention to their death-worthiness.
Studying states' varying death-obtaining behavior also offers a new
perspective on states' overall capital case behavior. In particular, states
with large death rows are not necessarily the states that most vigorously
pursue capital punishment. California and Texas have large death rows.
But California obtains death penalties at a lower rate per murder than any
other major death penalty state. And Texas' death-obtaining rate is not
noticeably different from that in other capital punishment states.
One caveat is in order: Appellate judges of course are not always free
to reverse capital case convictions or death sentences based on personal
notions of death-worthiness. They are constrained by the requirement that
there be legal error-although many states allow for proportionality re-
view.11 We assume that the tendency to detect legal error is related to
some underlying notion of death-worthiness, though not solely determined
by perceived death-worthiness.
Part II of this Article documents recent campaigns to oust judges
based on their decisions in death penalty cases. These campaigns suggest
that judges subject to partisan elections will be reluctant to question death
sentences. Part Im explains our methodology for exploring the relationship
among judicial elections, states' death-obtaining rates, and judicial review
of capital cases. Finally, Part IV reports our empirical results.
II. CAMPAIGNS TO OUST JUDGES BASED ON
DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS
Several initiatives have sought to unseat state supreme court judges
because of their votes in capital cases. 12 The most prominent recent cam-
11. See, e.g., Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High
Courts After Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 131-32
(1996).
12. For more detailed accounts of these efforts, see Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the
Judiciary: Can Justice be Done amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Un-
popular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997), and Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
[Vol. 72:465
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paign involved former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White.
White was appointed to the state's highest court in 1995. She participated
in only one capital case during her eighteen-month tenure on the court:
State v. Odom,13 a case in which the defendant's death sentence was
unanimously reversed. 14 White did not author the court's opinion; a re-
view of the Odom decision revealed that reversal of the defendant's death
sentence was mandated by previously existing state law which White had
no role in creating.
15
Justice White's retention election came soon after the Odom decision.
The new Republican Governor of Tennessee-Justice White was a Demo-
cratic appointee-in conjunction with several victim's rights groups, or-
chestrated a high profile campaign to unseat White because of her concur-
ring vote in Odom. The campaign attacked White as putting "'the rights of
criminals before the rights of victims,"' and as believing that repeatedly
raping and stabbing to death a seventy-eight year old woman "wasn't hei-
nous enough for the death penalty."'16 It worked and White was not re-
tained. Since then, other members of the Tennessee Supreme Court have
announced that they will not stand for reelection. 17 When the Governor of
Tennessee was asked after White's defeat if a judge should "look over his
shoulder" when making decisions, he responded: "I hope so.' 'I
Texas went through a similar experience in 1994. A Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decision reversing a high profile capital case led the
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capi-
tal Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995).
13. 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).
14. See id. See also Gibeaut, supra note 2, at 50.
15. Among the grounds relied on for reversal were at least two violations or misinterpretations
of express statutory commands. The State relied on an aggravating circumstance set forth in TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(I) (8) (Supp. 1998), which allows imposition of a death penalty upon a find-
ing that "the murder was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in
a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant's escape from lawful custody or from a place of
confinement." The Odom court held that an escapee whose escape had been completed was not cov-
ered by the escape provision in the statute. See Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 27. The court also held that the
trial court erred in refusing to admit, as evidence in mitigation, psychological testimony about the de-
fendant's personal and psychological history. This refusal contradicted a Tennessee statute plainly
contemplating testimony about the defendants' background. See id. at 27-28.
16. Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus
Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1, 11 (1997) (quoting TENNESSEE REPUBLICAN PARTY, JUST SAY NO! (1996)).
17. See id.
18. Paula Wade, White's Defeat Poses Legal Dilemma: How Is a Replacement Justice Picked?,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 3, 1996, at Al.
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Chairman of the state Republican Party to call for a takeover of the court. 19
Voters answered the call as Republican candidates won every position they
sought on the court. One of the new judges, Stephen W. Mansfield, cam-
paigned for the court on promises of expansion of the death penalty,
greater use of the harmless-error doctrine, and sanctions for attorneys who
file "frivolous appeals especially in death penalty cases." 20
In 1992, Mississippi Supreme Court Justice James Robertson was de-
feated in his reelection bid. The central issue in the campaign was the
death penalty. One advertisement used by his opponents urged the citizens
of Mississippi to "vote against Robertson because he's opposed to the
death penalty and he wants to let all these people go." 21 His opponent in
the Democratic primary ran as a "law and order candidate" with the en-
dorsement of the Mississippi Prosecutors' Association. He declared that
Robertson thought that "a defendant who 'shot an unarmed pizza delivery
boy in cold-blood' had not committed a crime serious enough to warrant
the death penalty. 22
Chief Justice Exum of the North Carolina Supreme Court was op-
posed because of his antideath penalty views.23  He was forced to fight
19. See Janet Elliott & Richard Connelly, Mansfield: The Stealth Candidate; lis Past Isn't
What It Seems, TEX. LAW., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1, 32. The case was Rodriguez v. State, 848 S.W.2d 141
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993),
20. John Williams, Election '94: GOP Gains Majority in State Supreme Court, HOUS. CHRON.,
Nov. 10, 1994, at A29. Ironically, it turned out that Judge Mansfield had misrepresented his prior
background, experience, and record, and after winning the election was deemed an "unqualified suc-
cess." See Janet Elliot, Unqualified Success: Mansfield's Mandate; Vote Makes a Case for Merit Se-
lection, TEX. LAW., Nov. 14, 1994, at 1.
21. Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse
and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 280, 281 n.84
(1994).
22. David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in
Mississippi, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1992). See also Death Penalty Caused Judge's Fall, Crit-
ics Say, GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH (Miss.), Mar. 13, 1992, at 3; Incumbent Robertson Defeated,
GREENWOOD COMMONWEALTH (Miss.), Mar. 11, 1992, at 1; Carole Lawes & Beverly Pettigrew
Kraft, High Court Judge Coddled Criminals, Critics Say, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 13,
1992, at lB. The resolution of the prosecutors' association asserted that Robertson's opponent "best
represents the views of the law abiding citizens" and "will give the crime victims and the good, honest
and law abiding people of this state a hearing that is at least as fair as that of the criminal in child
abuse, death penalty, and other serious criminal cases." Case, supra, at 16 n.108. Robertson was par-
ticularly criticized for a concurring opinion maintaining that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution did not permit the death penalty for rape where there was no loss of life, a position conclu-
sively established by the United States Supreme Court years earlier. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977). Justice Robertson was also vilified for dissenting opinions in two cases that the Supreme
Court subsequently reversed. See Case, supra, at 18-19.
23. See Joseph Neff, Exum Retiring as Chief Justice at End of Year, NEws & OBSERVER,
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 28, 1994, at Al. On Chief Justice Exum's death penalty views, see N.C.'s Top
Judge Blasts Death Penalty, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 15, 1994, at A3.
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back with statistics outlining the number of cases in which he had voted to
affirm the death sentence. Although he was reelected once, he announced
that he would not run again when his current term expired in 1998.24
Perhaps the best known of these incidents occurred in California. In
the mid-1980s three members of the California Supreme Court, including
Chief Justice Rose Bird, lost their jobs in a retention election dominated by
the death penalty.25 The Governor was an active participant in the ulti-
mately successful attempt to replace the judges, and went so far as to indi-
cate to two members of the court that he may change his mind about op-
posing them if they voted to uphold more death sentences.2 6 After the
court reversed several other capital cases, the governor carried out his
threat27 and successfully opposed the retention of all three members of the
24. When asked whether elected justices can survive if they sometimes overturn death sen-
tences, Exum said, "[Y]es, they can, but I believe it is becoming more and more difficult." Sympo-
sium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Disclosure and Due Process Survive the Per-
ceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 272 (1994).
For example, in his campaign for reelection to the Nevada Supreme Court, Justice Cliff Young
"formed a highly-visible political alliance with the State's attorney general, who in numerous cam-
paign advertisements publicly 'urged all Nevadans' to vote for Justice Young." Nevius v. Warden,
944 P.2d 858, 860 (Nev. 1997) (Springer, J., dissenting). Justice Young ran campaign advertisements
proclaiming that he had a "record of fighting crime," which included voting to uphold the death pen-
alty 76 times. See id. Young was reelected. A condemned man whose case came before the court
moved to recuse Young because the State was represented by the attorney general. During the pen-
dency of the case, Young had "repeatedly published his appreciation of the attorney general's support
and how much he 'welcomed' her support ... because of the attorney general's 'role as the State's top
law enforcement officer."' Id. Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court denied the motion to disqual-
ify Justice Young. See id. at 859. Justice Springer dissented saying:
"Tough on crime" claims made by judges in election campaigns are so common in Nevada
as to go almost unnoticed. Ourjudicial discipline authorities customarily ignore this kind of
judicial misconduct once the judge becomes elected or reelected. It goes beyond "tough on
crime" for a judge to claim that he is a "crime fighter," especially when, on top of this, the
judge identifies his principal election supporter as being the State's attorney general. Judges
are supposed to be judging crime not fighting it.
Id.
25. See Scott Wiener, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and Procedural Due Process,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 199 (1996). Chief Justice Rose Bird, Justice Cruz Reynoso, and
Justice James Grodin all lost their reelection bids. See id.
26. See Leo C. Wolinsky, Governor's Support for 2 Justices Tied to Death Penalty Votes, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1986, at 3. The Governor had already decided that Chief Justice Rose Bird had to be
replaced because of her "anti-death penalty voting pattern." The Governor had initially indicated he
might oppose Justice Mosk, but in 1985 Justice Mosk voted to affirm several death penalty convic-
tions and the Governor indicated he supported Mosk's retention. See John T. Wold & John H. Culver,
The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, The Electorate and the Issue of Judicial Ac-
countability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 349 (1987).
27. See Henry Unger, Will Vote Against Grodin, Reynoso, Deukmejian Says, L.A. DAMY J.,
Aug. 26, 1986, at I.
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California SOpreme Court.28 Today, the California Supreme Court has a
high affirmance rate in capital cases.29
Pressure on the judiciary can be more subtle. In South Carolina, for
example, judicial elections had never been politicized. No sitting justice
of the state supreme court had been challenged since 1893.30 However,
when Justice Toal-the supreme court's first female justice-stood for
reelection in 1995, she was attacked as a liberal judge who was "soft on
crime."3' Republicans, who had recently gained control of the state House
of Representatives, were reported to have encouraged a state trial judge to
run against Toal.3' Although Toal was ultimately successful in her reelec-
tion bid, the process had become politicized.
33
In 1994, South Carolina's new state Attorney General, Charlie Con-
don, was elected on the basis of his strong pro-death penalty views. As a
prosecutor, Condon had sent eleven men to death row. Both in his cam-
paign and following his election, he attacked the state and federal courts
for the lack of executions in South Carolina, making the widely publicized
comment that South Carolina's death row was one of the safest places in
the state because of the courts' lenient treatment of inmates serving death
sentences. 34 He was also instrumental in eliminating federal funding for
death penalty resource centers, organizations that represented indigent in-
28. See Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1986, at 1.
29. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State
Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1997)
[hereinafter Uelmen, Judicial Politicization].
30. See Robert Tanner, Ervin Says He Was Warned Off Toal Challenge, ASSOCIATED PRESS
POL. SERVICE, Dec. 11, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6752386.
31. Id. Justice Toal was also criticized for her actions on behalf of an inmate up for parole. See
also Gary Karr, Panel Avoids Vote, Tries to Find Facts on Toal Parole Letter, ASSOCIATED PRESS
POL. SERVICE, Jan. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5364574.
32. See Jesse Holland, South Carolina Bar Finds Toal, Ervin Highly Qualified, ASSOCIATED
PRESS POL. SERVICE, Jan. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5361501.
33. Justice Toal's reelection difficulties came on the heels of the failed supreme court bid of
Victor Pyle. Judge Pyle, a conservative law and order state trial judge, was widely considered the
front-runner for a vacant spot on the South Carolina Supreme Court. However, his campaign was de-
railed because of a temporary restraining order that he entered preventing antiabortion protesters from
picketing within 100 yards of an abortion clinic. Judge Pyle's decision was based on controlling Su-
preme Court precedent, but after his decision in this case became an issue, his chances in the race were
considered by some to be a "long shot." Cindi Ross Scoppe, Abortion Protest Order Hurt Pyle,
STATE (Columbia S.C.), Mar. 21, 1995. He eventually withdrew from the race. See Lisa Greene &
Cindi Ross Scoppe, Burnett Rises to High Court, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 22, 1995.
34. See Lisa Greene, Condon: Crime Fighter or Aspiring Politician?, STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Sept. 9, 1995 at Al ("I really think it's much safer to be on Death Row than to be a citizen of South
Carolina.").
[Vol. 72:465
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mates sentenced to death." Furthermore, when a federal district court
judge granted habeas corpus relief in a capital case, Condon was integrally
involved in a well publicized effort to have the judge impeached. 36 The
Attorney General remarked that "[j]ustice has been mocked"3 7 and used
the case as an example of the need for "dramatic reform'3 8 of the death
penalty system. The message to South Carolina's state judges from this
series of events was unmistakable: Reverse capital cases at your own
peril.39
I1. METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPrIVE STATISTICS
Capital punishment-related campaigns may lead those judges subject
to partisan elections to be more reluctant than other judges to question
capital convictions. By partisan elections, we mean elections in which
political parties are directly involved in the selection of candidates. 40  We
35. See Lisa Greene, Cuts Target Inmates' Defenders: U.S. Slashes Funds for Death-Penalty
Appeals, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 7, 1995, at Al.
36. See Chuck Crumbo, 2 Killers Granted New Trial, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 29, 1996,
at Al.
37. Id.
38. Michelle R. Davis, Death Row Appeal Finds Life, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 4, 1997,
at BI.
39. Although this Article focuses on state appellate courts, the politics of death also play out at
the local and trial court levels. For example, Judge Norman Landford, a judge in Harris County,
Texas, granted state habeas corpus relief in one capital case. The outraged District Attorney con-
vinced one of his assistants to run against Landford; the assistant won. See Mark Ballard, Gunning for
a Judge; Houston's Lanford Blames DA's Office for His Downfall, TEX. LAW., Apr. 13, 1992, at 1.
Also, in South Carolina, one state trial judge presiding over a state post-conviction relief action denied
relief, but sent counsel a letter stating, "Edward Lee Elmore may well not be guilty... and perhaps an
appellate court may agree with one of your positions." Letter from J. Ernest Kimard, Jr., Judge, to
Diana Holt, Attorney (Dec. 2, 1996) (on file with authors).
In Georgia, almost all of the state habeas corpus petitions are heard by two elected superior
court judges in Butts County, Georgia, the county where death row is located. They have never once
granted relief in a death penalty case. Of the cases reviewed by these judges, federal courts have
found constitutional violations in three-fourths of the cases. See Stephen B. Bright, Capital Punish-
ment and the Criminal Justice System: Courts of Vengeance or Courts of Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
279, 285 (1995). In states where trial judges have the power to override jury recommendations in
capital cases, that power is almost always exercised in favor of imposing a death sentence. In Ala-
bama, for example, judges impose a death sentence 10 times as frequently as they override a jury's
death recommendation. See Uelmen, Judicial Politicization, supra note 29, at 1141. One Alabama
judge sought reelection with the campaign slogan: "Some complain that he's too tough on criminals,
AND HE IS .... We need him now more than ever." Committee to Re-Elect Judge Mike McCor-
mick, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 4, 1994, at 4C (advertisement).
40. See, e.g., Samuel Latham Grimes, Comment, "Without Favor, Denial, or Delay": Will
North Carolina Finally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 2266, 2273 (1998)
(describing the history of the elective process in state judiciaries).
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rely on traditional classifications of states as having partisan or nonparti-
san elections.
4 1
Although we report in detail only the differences between states with
partisan elections and all states, other categorizations of state judicial se-
lection methods are plausible. One could, for example, distinguish be-
tween states with merit selection and other states, or between states with
elections (partisan or nonpartisan) and other states. The alternative cate-
gorizations we explored do not yield results materially different from those
reported here.42
To test hypotheses about the relation between judicial selection meth-
ods and capital case outcomes, one needs a measure of the outcome of
capital case appeals or other efforts employed by prisoners to obtain relief
from death sentences. But that measure should be evaluated in light of the
process by which cases are selected for capital treatment. Consequently,
one requires not only a measure of capital case outcomes, but also a meas-
ure of how cases are selected for capital punishment treatment.
A. MEASURING STATES' DEATH-OBTAINING BEHAVIOR
To assess selection of cases for capital treatment, one would ideally
like to know the death-worthiness of each potential capital case considered
by prosecutors, as well as the prosecutors' decisions whether to seek death.
However, we lack case-level knowledge of individual murder cases; we do
not know the details of each case that a prosecutor may have considered
for capital treatment. We therefore cannot independently assess whether
cases warranted seeking death sentences. Second-best methods of measur-
ing thus have to suffice. To construct indices of states' death-obtaining
41. For a categorization of state electoral systems, see LARRY BERKSON, SCOTT BELIER &
MICHELLE GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS
(1981); S.P. Garvey, Capital Punishment and State Supreme Court Activism in the United States:
Prospects for Dialogue 132 (1989) (M. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, on file with authors). See also
Hanssen, supra note 1, at 214 fig.1 (classifying states according to their judicial selection methods).
Traditional classifications are, however, somewhat suspect. See, e.g., Nicole C. Allbritain, Comment,
One Step Closer to Merit-Based Judicial Selection: Ohio's New Limitations on Judicial Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1323 (1996) (noting that Ohio's judicial elections
are officially classified as nonpartisan but are de facto partisan elections). The most independent ju-
diciaries tend not to be in states with many death penalties. See Grimes, supra note 40, at 2271-72
nn.45-47 (listing states with appointed judiciaries).
42. Differences between partisan election states and merit selection states are attributable al-
most entirely to Florida, which accounts for approximately 41% of the merit selection state cases.
And differences between partisan election states and nonpartisan election states are in a direction op-
posite of what one would predict. As a group, partisan election states are more likely to reverse death
sentences than are nonpartisan states. But this does not account for the merit selection states.
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behavior, we estimate the number of potential death penalty cases and the
number of death penalties actually imposed. We use these estimates to
construct a measure of death-obtaining rates which allows for interstate
comparisons.
1. The Number of Potential Death Penalty Cases in Each State
.We use the number of murders in each state as a proxy for the number
of possible death penalty cases. A crucial assumption is that the number of
death-eligible murders correlates with the number of murders. The corre-
lation need not be perfect, but it ought to be substantial. The FBI's Uni-
form Crime Reports indicate the number of murders for each state for each
year.43 The murder data are considered to be among the most reliable data
in the Uniform Crime Reports.44
2. The Number of Capital Sentences in Each State
Given each state's number of murders, we need measures of each
state's number of death penalties.45 The BJS data supply the number of
persons sentenced to death in each state in each year. Portions of those
data covering different time periods are used for our two different data-
bases, the BJS data and appellate opinions. For the BJS data covering re-
lief from death sentences, we cumulate the number of persons sentenced to
death for the years 1985 to 1994. This yields the total number of death
sentences obtained by each state for those years. For the appellate opinion
data, we use the number of BJS-reported death sentences for the period
43. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING PROGRAM, PART 93: SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS, 1996 (Inter-Univ. Consortium
for Pol. and Soc. Research No. 9028, 1998) [hereinafter FBI]. We relied on the same FBI data for
each year beginning with 1985.
44. See John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1147, 1153 (1998) (citing David Cantor & Lawrence E. Cohen, Comparing Measures of Homicide
Trends: Methodological and Substantive Differences in the Vital Statistics of Uniform Crime Report
Time Series 1933-1975, 9 SOC. SCI. RES. 121 (1980)). But see Michael Maxfield, Circumstances in
Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 675-81 (1989); Jona-
than R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman
Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 743, 762-63 (1990-91) (noting problems in
Supplemental Homicide Reports data).
An alternative to the number of murders is the number of murders reported by the FBI in which
the offender is known. The FBI data distinguish between incidents with known and unknown offend-
ers. See FBI, supra note 43, at 8. Using only known offender incidents eliminates cases in which a
suspect is never arrested and therefore never subject to a possible death penalty. We repeated our ba-
sic analysis using this measure of possible death penalty cases with no material change in the results.
45. A more complete model would account not only for states' death-obtaining behavior, but
also for their death-seeking behavior. Measuring death-seeking behavior requires knowing, inter alia,
the cases in which prosecutors sought death, regardless of case outcome.
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1994 to 1996. The time periods were chosen to coordinate with the peri-
ods covered by the BJS and appellate opinion databases, described in more
detail below.
3. States' Death-Obtaining Indices
We combine our measures of the number of possible death cases (as
measured by the number of murders) and the number of death penalties to
compute states' death-obtaining rates. For the BJS data, we divide the
number of persons reported by the BJS to have been sentenced to death in
each state from 1985 through 1994 by the number of murders in the state,
based on the 1985 to 1994 FBI Uniform Crime Reports. For the appellate
opinion data, we divided the number of persons reported to have been
sentenced to death from 1994 to 1996 by the number of murders in the
state, based on 1994 to 1996 FBI Uniform Crime Reports.
The utility of these death-obtaining rates rests on the assumption that
different rates of obtaining death sentences correlate with differences in
trial level behavior and not solely with different underlying distributions of
the death-worthiness of murder cases. In other words, we assume that
groups of murders were approximately equally death-worthy across states.
The trial-level process involves decisionmaking by prosecutors, judges,
and juries. If interstate variation exists in these groups' behavior, appellate
courts will review sets of cases with varying levels of death-worthiness
from state to state. We suspect that the greatest variant in trial level death-
obtaining behavior is the prosecutors' differing propensities to seek the
death penalty.46
State law could also affect death-obtaining rates. For example, some
states are regarded as having death penalty laws that make it easier to ob-
tain death sentences than in other states.47 States with laws that facilitate
obtaining death penalties might be viewed as generating a less death-
worthy set of cases for appellate review. But this need not be the predic-
tion based on laws with varying severity. To illustrate, assume that State
A's law favors death more than State B's. Holding constant prosecutor
and adjudicator behavior, the potential number of death penalties per 100
murders in State A is ten and the potential number in State B is five. As-
sume that all potential death sentence cases in fact lead to death sentences.
Reviewing courts, applying the same laws as the prosecutors and adjudica-
46. States in which prosecutors consistently seek death in less death-worthy groups of cases
should have lower rates of capital sentences at the trial court level. However, some less death-worthy
cases will inevitably survive the trial process.
47. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 7, at 235-36.
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tors, may affirm these sentences at the same rates. Different death-
obtaining rates need not lead to different reversal rates because the states
have, in effect, generated different criteria of death-worthiness.
Intrastate differences among laws could confound interpretation of
the relation between death-obtaining rates and reversal rates. We might
observe constant reversal rates for different death-obtaining rates simply
because of different legal rules. We do not address this issue in detail for
two reasons. First, it is our judgment that state death penalty laws, despite
differing structures, are much more alike than different.48 The basic
structure is, in one way or another, to define a class of aggravated murders.
The circumstances of aggravation probably do not differ dramatically.
And nominal difference in statutes may fade in application. Second, we
applied one knowledgeable source's categorization of states as having
more or less broad death penalty statutes.49 We found no material differ-
ence in states' death-obtaining behavior based on that categorization.
50
B. MEASURING RELIEF FROM DEATH SENTENCES
We use two measures of relief from death sentences. One is based on
the outcomes of capital sentence appeals reported in our database of state
court appellate opinions. The other is based on relief rates reported in the
BJS capital punishment database.
1. The BJS Capital Punishment Database
The BJS tracks every person who is or has been under a sentence of
death since 1973. The available data are current through 1995 and contain
6,228 observations. 51 To avoid the effects of early twists and turns in the
post-Furman52 death penalty era, we limit the sample to those defendants
48. This is not surprising in light of the historical development of the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional limitation on the states' imposition of the death penalty. See Stephen P. Garvey, "As the
Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 997 n.35, 1009-
10 (1996).
49. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 7, at 236-37 (categorizing death penalty statutes as of 1983).
50. Although it does not affect the judicial selection method or death-obtaining results we re-
port below, we do find a positive correlation between a broad death-obtaining statute and relief from
death sentences.
51. See BJS, supra note 8, at i. The same defendant may constitute more than one observation
in the data. These defendants presumably were removed from death row, then reentered after a resen-
tencing proceeding or a subsequent conviction and death sentence. In counting the number of death
sentences in each state, we limited each defendant to one observation. In the regression models re-
ported below, we accounted for the possibility of multiple observations of individual defendants.
52. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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sentenced after 1984.53 Thus, our BJS data cover defendants sentenced to
death from 1985 to 1995. Defendants being considered for potential relief
from death sentences have to be matched with death-obtaining rates from
an appropriate time period. Death-obtaining rates used, as discussed
above, cover the years 1985 to 1994. This is a reasonable period to use for
potential death penalty cases because it substantially overlaps with the
sentencing year period, 1985-1995. The one-year difference in ending
years allows at least some 1994 and earlier murders to proceed to trial and
lead to sentencing through 1995. We further limit the sample to the
twenty-one states in our appellate opinion database. These selection crite-
ria yield 3,046 observations in the BJS data.
The BJS data come from the prisons, which collect information under
the National Prisoner Statistics Program.54 The data include information
on inmates whose death sentences were removed, including information
about the reason for an inmate's removal from death sentence classifica-
tion. The BJS data include among the reasons for removal: whether a
capital sentence was declared unconstitutional, whether a capital sentence
was overturned, and whether both a conviction and capital sentence were
overturned.55 We define a variable, "relief," meaning relief from a death
sentence, to equal one when any of these reasons for removal were present.
We define relief to equal zero when a prisoner remains on death row and is
executed, or dies from other causes, while on death row.
2. The Appellate Case Sample
Our appellate case sample consists of every direct appeal of a death
penalty case available on Westlaw for the three-year period 1995 to 1997
for twenty-six states. The states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. These states accounted for 3,112 of
the 3,208 state prisoners (97%) under sentence of death as of December
53. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court approved several new death penalty
statutes on the grounds that they addressed the problems of arbitrariness and discrimination identified
in Furman. By 1983, in cases such as Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), and Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983), the Court had dismantled "most of the procedural restrictions that were imposed
on capital sentencing by Gregg and the other 1976 death penalty cases." SAMUEL R. GROSS &
ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 13-15
& n.30 (1989).
54. See BJS, supra note 8, at xix.
55. See id. at 10.
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31, 1996.56 We do not include Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Utah cases in our appellate case analysis because these
states had too few death penalty cases to permit meaningful analysis. This
leaves twenty-one states in the state appellate case sample.
We used search terms broad enough to identify capital cases in each
state. With the help of research assistants, we recorded information about
each case, including whether the case involved a resentencing.
To compute a state's reversal rate in capital cases, we divide the
number of appellate cases in which the defendant achieved some success
by the number of appellate cases found. Success is not a self-defining
term in assessing litigation. 57 It is possible to have a death sentence va-
cated on appeal, have the case remanded to a trial court, and have a death
sentence imposed again. At the end of such a process, the defendant may
be no better off than at the beginning, except for the delay, which is itself a
nontrivial benefit to a prisoner under sentence of death. For defendants
with more than one appeal in the database, we use the most recent appeal.
Thus, for example, if a defendant's conviction was affirmed by an inter-
mediate appellate court and a state supreme court, only the latter case is
retained. We do not otherwise trace each case's subsequent history. We in
effect take a snapshot of the process as of a substantial (three-year) period
of time.
We define success (a reversal) to exist when the defendant obtains a
ruling that precludes imposition of a death sentence unless further action is
taken by some court. Therefore, reversals of convictions, remands for
hearings on specific issues, vacation of death sentences, and remands for
resentencing are defendant successes. Complications arise when both par-
ties appealed or when the state appealed. We limit our analysis to cases in
which the defendant's appeal seeks relief from a death sentence. Thus,
appeals by the state are not included.
The 1995 to 1997 appellate opinion data match the defendants' ap-
peals being considered for reversal with the time span covered by the
Uniform Crime Reports 1994 to 1996 murder data, with a one year lag in
the measure of murders. The one year lag in the measure of murders al-
lowed the cases to become ripe for adjudication during the time period
covered by the appellate data.
56. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996, at 6 tbl.5 (rev.
1998).
57. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal
Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 517 (1989) (noting the complications in determining who
"wins" an appellate court decision).
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3. Differences Between the Measures of Relieffrom Death Sentences
Important differences exist between the BJS-based measure of obtain-
ing relief from death sentences and the measure based on our reported ap-
pellate opinions. First, the reported opinions cover the years 1995 to 1997.
The BJS data try to include all persons on death row, and any relief they
obtained through 1995. Differences in the two measures of capital defen-
dant success rates may result from events relating to a state's capital de-
fendant population for only one of the time periods. For example, a single
Supreme Court case may have required reversal of many convictions
within a state before 1995.58 This, in turn, may have led to a burst of death
penalty reversals before 1995, followed by a period of fewer reversals after
1995.
Second, our opinion data are limited to state courts. We are primarily
interested in the effect of judicial selection methods across states and
therefore do not include federal cases among opinions analyzed. Although
the BJS data include relief from death sentences by both state and federal
courts, they do not allow us to distinguish between relief granted by the
two court systems.
Third, the BJS data include both direct appellate relief and post-
conviction relief. The appellate data cover only direct appeals. We also
have data on about 500 state post-conviction appeals. Including them
would not change the results reported here. We exclude state post-
conviction activity only because not all states issue opinions in such
cases.
59
We thus have measures of both trial level death-obtaining behavior in
a state, and measures of defendants' success in obtaining relief from death
sentences-appellate and otherwise. These measures should be positively
correlated. The appellate rate of reversing death penalty cases should be a
function of how liberally the state sought and obtained death in murder
cases. In a state that obtains death sentences relatively often-as measured
by a high ratio of death penalty direct appeals to murders-there should be
an increased chance of reversal. A high death-obtaining rate should mean
58. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (invalidating a capital punishment
scheme which impermissibly limited juries' consideration of mitigating circumstances).
59. Appeals in Missouri death penalty cases are often described as appeals from post-conviction
proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600, 601 (Mo. 1997); State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d
250 (Mo. 1997). However, these were more in the nature of direct appeals from denials of post-trial
relief and not true post-conviction proceedings. We therefore treated these Missouri cases as direct
appeals.
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that weaker, less death-worthy cases were brought. Reversals should thus
come at a higher rate.
A caveat about the use of appellate opinions is in order: Opinions,
both trial level and appellate, may not be representative of all underlying
cases.6" For example, published opinions in cases involving punitive dam-
ages awards have systematically higher awards than the mass of trial level
punitive damages cases that do not result in published opinions. 61 But this
concern is less of a problem in death penalty cases than in other classes of
cases. Common sense, as well as some evidence, indicate that little selec-
tion of cases is at work in the decision to appeal a death sentence. A per-
son condemned to death has little to lose by appealing, thus rates of appeal
in death penalty habeas corpus proceedings are by far the highest of any
area of law for which the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts maintains
data.62 The great majority of death penalty appeals wind up in state su-
preme courts,63 which one expects to issue predominantly published opin-
ions.
Table 1 summarizes the sources of data used in this study, as de-
scribed in Parts ]II.A and lIlI.B. It separates the sources by our two differ-
ent studies of death penalty adjudication, the BJS data and the appellate
opinion data.
60. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How
Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991) (noting the discrepancies between deci-
sions in intent-based Constitutional cases as a whole and the published opinions in that area of the
law); Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 57 (rejecting the use of district court level opinions because
trial judges tend to publish in a skewed sample of cases); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race,
Gender, Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases
Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (comparing published opinions with
filed cases); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue I1, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison
of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1133 (1990)
(noting that a comparison of published and unpublished cases reveals substantial differences between
them).
61. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages
Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards, and Fore-
casting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 S. Cr. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 1999)
(concluding that published opinion cases tend to have higher stakes, and therefore higher awards).
62. See Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Evidence Relating to Prisoner Filings Presented at the
Federal Judicial Center's Workshop on § 1983 Litigation for District and Magistrate Judges (Aug. 13-
14, 1997).
63. See SNELL, supra note 56, at 3.
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TABLE 1. DATA SOURCES FOR NUMBERS OF MURDERS, DEATH
PENALTIES, DEATH-OBTAINING RATES, AND RELIEF RATES
Study based on BJS data appellate opinion data
Numbers of murders FBI data 1985-1994 FBI data 1994-1996
Number of death BJS data 1985-1994 BJS data 1994-1996
penalties
Death-obtaining rates death penalties/murders death penalties/murders
Relief rates BJS data 1985-1995 appellate data
1995-1997
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables in this
study. Four pairs of columns should be distinguished: the number of mur-
ders in columns one and two, the number of death penalties in columns
three and four, states' death-obtaining rates in columns five and six, and
rates of obtaining relief from death sentences in columns seven and eight.
Column nine reports the number of direct death penalty appeals reported
for each state from 1995 to 1997. Column ten reports whether the state has
partisan judicial elections.
The first two columns show the number of murders in each state from
1994 through 1996, and from 1985 through 1994, respectively.' 4 For the
appellate opinion data covering 1995 to 1997, we use the shorter period of
murders to compute a death-obtaining rate. For the BJS-based measure of
the number of death penalties, the longer period is appropriate because the
data on relief for capital prisoners extend from 1985 through 1995.
The third and fourth columns in Table 2 report our two measures of
the number of death penalties. The BJS data in the third column are the
number of death penalties imposed from 1985 through 1994. The data in
the fourth column are the number of death penalties imposed from 1994
through 1996.65
The two death-obtaining rates reported in columns five and six are
computed from the number-of-murder and number-of-death-penalty col-
64. The on-line version of the Uniform Crime Reports is missing the number of murders in
Kentucky for 1988 and the number of murders in Florida for 1988 through 1991. We used interpola-
tion to fill in these missing values.
65. The 1996 data come from SNELL, supra note 56.
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umns. The first death-obtaining rate column is the percent of murders
from 1994 to 1996 that led to a death sentence in that period. The second
rate column is the percent of murders from 1985 through 1994 that led to a
death sentence from 1985 through 1994, according to BJS. These two
measures of death-obtaining behavior are best viewed as indices facilitat-
ing interstate comparison rather than as measures of absolute activity lev-
els. Thus, the relations among the states' numbers in the death-obtaining
rate columns are important, not their absolute levels. If one wants to relate
a death-obtaining rate to real world events, the first row of Table 2 sug-
gests, for example, that in Alabama 2.93% of the murders from 1985
through 1994 led to imposition of the death penalty. In Nevada, that rate
was over 5%.
The death penalty relief columns show defendants' rate of success in
contesting death sentences. The first relief rate column is the percent of
death sentences imposed from 1985 through 1995 for which BJS reports a
defendant receiving relief, either through reversal of conviction, reduction
of sentence, or both. The second relief rate column shows the percent of
1995 to 1997 death penalty appellate opinions in which the defendant re-
ceived some relief.
The two death-obtaining rate columns in Table 2, columns five and
six, show substantial interstate variation in death-obtaining behavior. For
example, both columns show that Oklahoma, Nevada, North Carolina,
Mississippi, Arizona, Alabama, and Florida have high death-obtaining
rates. Both columns indicate that California has a low death-obtaining
rate.
The penultimate column of Table 2 reports the number of direct
capital case appeals from 1995 through 1997. These form the basis for
computing the appellate reversal rates reported in column eight.
Anecdotal evidence supports the death-obtaining rates reported in
columns five and six. The fairly high rate for Pennsylvania is consistent
with the Philadelphia district attorney's dedication to seeking the death
penalty.66 But Pennsylvania's death-obtaining rate is kept from being ex-
tremely high by a much lower rate of death-seeking behavior by Pitts-
burgh's district attorney. 67 Texas' more moderate rate of death-obtaining
66. See Rosenberg, supra note 6.
67. See id. (reporting that about one defendant per year receives a death sentence in Allegheny
County).
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behavior is consistent with reported levels of death-seeking behavior by
Dallas and Houston district attorneys.68 California's low rate of death-
obtaining behavior is consistent with reported low death-seeking and
death-obtaining rates in Los Angeles County.69 Louisiana's low rate of
death-obtaining behavior is consistent with the reported lack of success of
the New Orleans district attorney in obtaining death sentences. 70 Illinois'
moderate rate of death-obtaining behavior is consistent with relatively few
capital sentences being imposed in Chicago.71
The relief columns in Table 2 show substantial interstate variation in
relief rates. In the appellate opinion relief column, column eight, Arkan-
sas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee have the highest rever-
sal rates. Virginia has the lowest. In the BJS-based relief column, the
highest relief rates are found in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Mississippi.
We thus find not only interstate variation in relief rates but some variation
in relief rates across our two measures of relief.
IV. EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF RELIEF FROM
DEATH SENTENCES
States have a broad range of death penalty reversal rates. The inter-
state differences in each of Table 2's relief columns are statistically sig-
nificant (p<.0001). 72 But the differences between the two relief columns,
and the different contents of their underlying data, suggest exploring the
two relief rate patterns separately.
Table 2's appellate opinion relief column, column eight, is more ap-
propriate to assess the effect of differences in judicial selection methods on
68. See id. Although Houston's district attorney has a reputation as a champion of the death
penalty, he asked for it in only 10% of the eligible cases in one year. See id.
69. See id. (reporting that the death penalty was sought in 18 of 2,000 homicides and obtained
in six cases).
70. See id. (noting that the New Orleans district attorney asks for death in every eligible homi-
cide, but has obtained it only twice in five years).
71. See id. (reporting that the Chicago district attorney asks for death in a large majority of eli-
gible cases but obtains only about seven death penalties a year).
72. By convention, the hypothesis being tested is called the null hypothesis. See GEORGE W.
SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL MErHoDs 64 (8th ed. 1989). The reported signifi-
cance level is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. That is, the significance
level provides an inverse measure of the likelihood that the correlation between death-obtaining rates
a real relation rather than mere random variation. The smaller the significance level, the more sur-
prised one would be to observe the relation if the tested hypothesis (no relation) were true. See id. at
65. By arbitrary convention, results that are significant at or below the .05 level are described as sta-
tistically significant. See, e.g., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
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interstate case outcomes than the BJS-based column seven, because only
the opinion column is limited to decisions by state court judges. By con-
trast, the BJS-based relief rates include all possible modes of obtaining re-
lief, including habeas corpus cases decided by federal judges.
A. THE ABSENCE OF A CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTION METHOD
AND REVERSALS
In the appellate data, the hypothesis that partisan election of judges
correlates with death penalty affirmance holds up for North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. All have partisan elections and low reversal
rates. South Carolina and Virginia could also be viewed as fitting the pat-
tern because their legislatures elect supreme court justices. But column
eight also shows that Alabama, Mississippi, and Illinois, which have parti-
san elections, have high capital sentence reversal rates. Therefore, partisan
elections, standing alone, cannot explain the pattern of appellate results.
States without partisan elections also show varying reversal rates. Okla-
homa and Florida have high reversal rates. Indiana has a low reversal rate.
Overall, we did not find a statistically significant relation between judicial
selection method and reversal rate. A test of the significance of their rela-
tion is significant at the .727 level.73 If we count South Carolina and Vir-
ginia as partisan election states because their legislatures play a role in se-
lecting judges, the significance level is .296.
Part of the reason why judicial selection methods may not explain the
data well is that the classification of judicial selection methods is crude.
For example, in the customary classification of state judicial selection
methods, both New York and Texas are classified as partisan election
states.74 Yet, one hears much less complaining about the influence of
campaign funding and contributions on justice with respect to New York
than with respect to Texas.7 5 And nominally nonpartisan judicial elections
can take on the characteristics of partisan contests.76 Indeed, if we take the
73. The significance level reported in text is based on Fisher's exact test. For a discussion of
the benefits of Fisher's exact test over the chi-squared significance test, see ALAN AGRESTI, ANALYSIS
OF ORDINAL CATEGORICAL DATA 11 (1984).
74. See, e.g., Hanssen, supra note 1, at 214 fig.I.
75. See, e.g., Clay Robison, Ex-high Court Judges Dispute Payola Claims, HoUs. CHRON.,
Aug. 15, 1998, MetFron Section, at 33; Editorial, Then and Now Texas Justice Has Improved, But
Reform Still Needed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 1998, at 28A.
76. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 68, 69 ("Even nonpartisan
elections become political tinderboxes when special interests get involved."). In addition, judges
elected in a partisan manner may decide cases in ways that make death penalties more likely. We
find, however, that death-obtaining rates are lower in partisan election states than in other states.
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liberty of reclassifying Ohio, which officially has nonpartisan judicial
elections but in fact seems to have partisan elections,77 a significant rela-
tion between partisan election status and reversal rates does emerge
(p=.041).
Therefore, a statistically significant relationship between judicial se-
lection methods and death penalty case outcomes depends, in part, on how
strictly one adheres to conventional classification of judicial election
methods. But the relation depends largely on how one state, Ohio, is clas-
sified and does not hold for the mass of states. Whatever the reason, the
conventional wisdom about partisan judicial elections at best modestly
explains the observed state-level pattern of appellate reversal rates in
capital cases.
B. ACCOUNTING FOR CASE SELECTION: APPELLATE OPINION
REVERSAL RATES
Prospects for explaining the pattern might improve if we account for
case selection. Figure 1 shows the relation between the appellate reversal
rate in capital cases (Table 2, column eight) and the rate at which states
obtain the death penalty (Table 2, column five). We expect the relation to
flow from the Figure's lower left to its upper right. The expected relation
between death-obtaining rates and reversal rates does not emerge.
Perhaps, however, a discernible pattern would emerge if we simulta-
neously accounted for judicial selection methods and death-obtaining
rates. This requires multivariate analysis of the data. Multiple regression
is a statistical technique that quantifies the influence of each of several
factors (independent variables) on the phenomenon being studied
(dependent variable). Multiple regression works to segregate the effects of
various factors such as, for our purposes, case selection and judicial selec-
tion.78 Since our cases have dichotomous outcomes-death sentences are
either reversed or not-we use logistic regression.7 9 We also account for
the fact that the data are sampled by state.80 For this study, the dependent
variable is whether the case resulted in a reversal and the primary
77. See Allbritain, supra note 41. However, in New York, partisan elections exist for trial
courts but not for the state's highest court.
78. See generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEViN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS ch. 12
(1990).
79. See id. at 448.
80. See Martin Frankel, Sampling Theory, in HANDBOOK OF SURVEY RESEARCH 21, 37-40
(Peter H. Rossi, James D. Wright & Andy B. Anderson eds., 1983) (describing stratified sampling).
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FIGURE 1. RELATION BETWEEN STATES' DEATH OBTAINING RATES AND
DEATH PENALTY REVERSAL RATES
81
The death-obtaining rate is an index allowing comparison of death-
obtaining rates across states. It is based on the number of death sen-
tences from 1994 to 1996 and the state's murder rate from 1994 to 1996.
The reversal rate is the proportion of 1995-1997 capital case opinions
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death-obtaining rate
independent variables are the death-obtaining (case-selection) rate and a
dummy variable that equals one if a state had partisan judicial elections.
Regression analysis allows us to control for another factor. Defen-
dants appealing from the reimposition of previously imposed, but reversed,
death sentences are likely, on average, to be weak candidates for reversal.
These defendants have been previously sentenced to death. The subse-
quent resentencing to death, the subject of appeal in our data, could be
taken as some evidence that these cases are death-worthy or that the argu-
ments against death were not forcefully marshalled. Whatever the reason
for the prior death sentence, it seems appropriate to account for whether an
appeal involves a second death sentence. Simple statistics confirmed the
possible need to control for this factor. Nine of fifty-seven resentencings
(16%) led to reversals compared to 154 of 754 of cases (20%) not involv-
ing resentencings.82 To control for the kind of appeal, we include a
dummy variable equal to one for resentencing cases and zero otherwise.
Table 3 summarizes the independent variables in our model of appel-
late reversals. It includes a second partisan election variable, which treats
South Carolina and Virginia as states with partisan judicial elections. Ta-
ble 3's next-to-last column shows that no variable is significantly corre-
81. Data obtained from westlaw; BJS, supra note 8; FBI, supra note 43.
82. Using Fisher's exact test, this difference is significant at the .494 level.
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lated with appellate reversal rates of death sentences (Table 2's column
eight).
TABLE 3. DESCRIPTvE STATISTICS, DEATH SENTENCES IN STATES WITH
NINE OR MORE DIRECT CAPITAL CASE APPEALS FROM 1995-1997
mean range significance* n
Reversal rate .202 0-1 - 812
State's death-obtaining rate, .028 .008-.061 .444 813
1994-96
Partisan election state .464 0-1 .727 813
Partisan election state, in- .512 0-1 .296 813
cluding SC & VA
Resentencing .070 0-1 .494 812
*In relation to reversal rate
Regression analysis confirms the absence of such significant correla-
tions, but it does show that the correlations are in the expected directions. 83
Table 4 reports the regression results for a model using the variables in
Table 3. The negative sign on the partisan election dummy variable indi-
cates that appellate win rates correlate negatively with judicial selection by
partisan elections. But this correlation is not statistically significant. Nor
does the death obtaining rate appreciably help in explaining reversals of
death sentences. These results provide little support for the influence of
case selection or the influence of judicial selection methods on death
penalty case appellate outcomes. We do note, however, that reclassifying
83. A word of caution is in order about interpreting the statistical insignificance of the differ-
ence between partisan election states' and other states' death-obtaining rates. Understanding why re-
quires considering the power of a statistical test. The power of a test is the likelihood of detecting an
effect of a specified size at a specified significance level. If a test is not very powerful, the likelihood
of detecting the effect is small. Perfectly executed studies may fail to reveal socially important differ-
ences "simply because the sample sizes are too small to give the procedure enough power to detect the
effect." STANTON A. GLANTZ, PRIMER OF BIosTAisTITics 178 (4th ed. 1997). It is important to con-
sider a statistical test's power when one claims that no significant effect has been detected.
A power calculation requires specifying what change in the observed death-obtaining rates we
would regard as socially meaningful. In order to have a high probability of detecting a statistically
significant difference of a socially meaningful size, a larger sample size-a larger number of death
penalty states-would need to be present. So our failure to detect a significant difference should not
be taken as firm evidence that no such difference exists.
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Ohio as having partisan elections would yield a larger and more significant
(p=.044) coefficient for the partisan election variable.
TABLE 4. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE REVERSAL
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1995-1997
dependent variable = reversal of death sentence
Death-obtaining rate, 1994-1996 1.678(.784)




F-test significance of model .616
Number of cases 811
Number of states 21
Significance levels in parentheses
C. ACCOUNTING FOR CASE SELECTION: BJS DATA
Relief rates based on the BJS data can be compared to the appellate
opinion-based results. As in the case of the appellate data, we control for
each state's death-obtaining rate. We also use the partisan election dummy
variable to control for judicial selection method.
The BJS data allow us to control for other characteristics that might
relate to the likelihood of obtaining relief. We control for the defendant's
race by using dummy variables for black and hispanic status. We control
for the defendant's marital status by dummy variables for married and for
whether a defendant was divorced or separated. We also control for the
defendant's age and education. 4 We control for the defendants' legal
status at the time of the capital offense through two variables. A dummy
variable, "charges pending," has a value of one if the defendant was not
under sentence at the time of the capital offense but charges were pending.
A second dummy variable, "under sentence," has a value of one if the de-
84. Education is coded on a 1 to 11 scale, with 1 representing less than a seventh grade educa-
tion and 11 representing more than four years of college. See BJS, supra note 8, at 6. The defen-
dant's race, marital status, age, and education are not reported in most appellate opinions.
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fendant was on probation, on parole, had escaped, or was imprisoned at the
time of the capital offense. Finally, we control for whether the defendant
had been convicted of a prior murder through the dummy variable, "prior
murder."
For North Carolina, it is appropriate to account for one case that led
to an unusual number of grants of relief during the period covered by the
BJS data. In McKoy v. North Carolina,5 the Supreme Court held that
North Carolina's requirement that jurors agree unanimously on mitigating
factors impermissibly limited jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence.
A sharp decrease in relief from North Carolina death sentences occurred
for defendants sentenced after McKoy.86 We therefore include a dummy
variable equal to one for North Carolina defendants sentenced to death be-
fore March 5, 1990, the date McKoy was decided. 7
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the BJS variables used, to-
gether with the significance of their relation to whether relief was ob-
tained. It includes death sentences imposed after 1984 in the twenty-one
states covered by the appellate data. Strong correlations exist between
whether a defendant was under sentence at the time of a capital offense
and whether the defendant obtains relief from a capital sentence. Educa-
tion correlates negatively with relief: The more educated a defendant, the
less likely relief is obtained. Education may be functioning as a proxy for
the absence of mental illness or retardation. Furthermore, women are sig-
nificantly more likely than men to obtain relief from death row.
The primary variables of interest are the states' death-obtaining rate
and the states' partisan election status. Unlike Table 3, Table 5 shows a
significant correlation between death-obtaining rates and obtaining relief
from death sentences. Like Table 3, Table 5 shows no significant relation
between partisan election of judges and obtaining relief from death sen-
tences. This result is independent of how one characterizes Ohio.
85. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
86. BJS data show that relief was granted to 38 of 41 North Carolina defendants in the years
1987 through 1989. For 1991 and 1992, relief was granted to 16 of 42 North Carolina defendants. On
remand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decided that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision did not
invalidate North Carolina's entire capital sentencing scheme, but only an important judge-made jury
instruction requiring unanimity with respect to mitigating circumstances. See State v. McKoy, 394
S.E.2d 426 (N.C. 1990).
87. We explored the effect of including a dummy variable for Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held South Carolina erroneously excluded mitigating evi-
dence consisting of the testimony of two jailers and a visitor to the effect that the defendant had made
a good adjustment during the seven and a half months he had spent in jail between his arrest and trial.
Such a variable had no material effect on our results.
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TABLE 5. DESCRiTIVE STATISTICS, DEATH SENTENCES IN 21 STATES,
1985-1995
mean range significance* number
Relief granted to defendant 0.20 0-1 3,046
Black defendant 0.42 0-1 0.406 3,046
Hispanic defendant 0.08 0-1 0.168 3,046
Female defendant 0.02 0-1 0.016 3,046
Married defendant 0.22 0-1 0.080 3,046
Divorced or separated defendant 0.20 0-1 0.819 3,046
Age of defendant 30.97 16-77 0.283 3,046
Education of defendant 4.80 1-11 0.000 2,637
Charges pending at time of crime 0.06 0-1 0.643 3,046
Under sentence at time of crime 0.30 0-1 0.000 3,046
Prior murder conviction 0.06 0-1 0.272 3,046
State's death-obtaining rate, 2.58 0.85-5.24 0.000 3,046
1985-94
Year of sentencing 1990.03 1985-95 0.000 3,046
Partisan election state 0.43 0-1 0.748 3,046
McKoy dummy variable 0.02 0-1 0.000 3,046
(for N.C.)
*In relation to rate of relief from death sentence
Importantly, Table 5 shows that a defendant's year of sentencing is
significantly correlated with the grant of relief. In particular, the earlier
the sentencing year, the more likely the defendant is to obtain relief from a
death sentence. This raises the problem of what is termed data censoring,
which we explore in Table 6.
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Table 6 reports, by year, the relief rates based on the BJS data. Each
row shows the proportion of cases in which relief was granted for a year of
sentencing. For example, 42% of the defendants sentenced to death in
1985 obtained, at some point, some relief from their death sentence or
conviction. Table 6 shows a decline in relief over time, with the relief rate
reaching zero in 1995, the most recent sentencing year in the data. The
data are censored in the sense that it apparently takes a substantial period
of time to obtain relief from death sentences. Those who have been on
death row only briefly are much less likely to have obtained relief from
their death sentences. It may also be that obtaining relief in recent years
has become more difficult. But the delay between sentence and relief
would lead to a declining relief rate being observed even if there were no
decrease in the rate that relief was in fact being granted. Enough time has
not elapsed for recently sentenced defendants to have obtained relief.
TABLE 6. RELIEF RATES FROM DEATH BY YEAR OF SENTENCING,
BJS DATA, 1985-1995
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The presence of censoring suggests the propriety of survival time
models for the BJS data. 8 Such models account for the fact that the event
of interest, in this case relief from a death sentence, may not have occurred
simply because sufficient time had not elapsed.s9 These models also allow
for different times of entry into the sample, which we have in the form of
different years of sentencing,90 and exit from and reentry into the sample,
which occurs when defendants obtain relief and are later resentenced to
death. These features make a survival time proportional hazard model
preferable to a simple logistic regression model, which ignores the time to
an event (relief from a death sentence in our case) and censoring. 91 Table
7 reports Cox proportional hazard models.9 Logistic regression models
do not yield results that differ materially from those reported here.
Table 7 reports two models. The second model excludes the defen-
dant's education variable, which is missing for almost 400 defendants. As
is common for proportional hazard models, the coefficients are reported as
hazard ratios. 93 A hazard ratio of one means that a variable has no effect.
A hazard ratio of ten, for example, means that a unit increase in the de-
pendent variable corresponds to a tenfold increase in the likelihood of re-
lief. A hazard ratio of .1 implies that a unit increase in the dependent vari-
able corresponds to a tenfold reduction in the likelihood of relief.
Table 7 confirms the simple statistics presented in Table 5. Of par-
ticular interest is the significance of the states' death-obtaining rate. A
strong, significant correlation exists between death-obtaining behavior and
relief from death sentences. A 1% increase in a state's death-obtaining
rate corresponds to about a 20% increase in the likelihood of relief being
granted.94
88. See D.R. Cox & D. OAKES, ANALYSIS OF SuRvivAL DATA 4 (1984); DAVID G.
KLEINBAUM, SuRvIvAL ANALYSIS: A SELF-LEARNG TEXT 5-7 (1996).
89. See COX & OAKE, supra note 88, at 4; KLEINBAUM, supra note 88, at 5-8.
90. See Cox & OAKES, supra note 88, at 2.
91. See KLEINBAUM, supra note 88, at 98.
92. Cox models are considered to be the most popular of the survival models. See id. at 96-98.
For discussion of the choice among survival models, see id.
93. See id. at 33.
94. To check whether the extreme censoring in the data affects the results, we ran the same
model limited to prisoners entering death rows from 1985 to 1990. The results were not materially
different from those reported in Table 7 except that the year-of-sentencing variable's hazard ratio was
closer to one and insignificant.
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TABLE 7. Cox PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODELS OF RELIEF FROM
DEATH SENTENCES, 1985-1995
Time variable is months to relief
Censoring occurs for cases in which no relief has been granted.
Black defendant 1.025 1.082(.795) (.377)
.775 .910
Hispanic defendant (.177) (.588)
1.802 1.843
Female defendant (.014) (.009)
1.034 1.022Married defendant (.758) (.827)
.818 .834Divorced or separated defendant (.112) (.130)
1.009 1.009




Charges pending at time of capital crime (.687) (.891)
Defendant under sentence at time of .735 .758
capital crime (.003) (.006)
.634 .770
Defendant committed prior murder (.029) (.167)
1.180 1.195
State's death-obtaining rate, 1985-1994 (.000) (.000)
Year of sentencing .933 .924(.000) (.000)
.901 .913
State has partisan judicial elections (.306) (.336)
4.463 4.549
McKoy dummy variable for N.C. cases 4.000 4.000(.000) (.000)
.841 .793Prior death sentence (.485) (.348)
Number of defendants 2,551 2,956
Number obtaining relief 521 584
Log-likelihood -3632.140 -4156.275
Chi-squared probability .0000 .0000
Significance levels are in parentheses.
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The other variable of primary interest, whether a state has partisan
judicial elections, follows the pattern in the appellate opinion results re-
ported in Table 4. The variable's effect is small and insignificant. This is
true whether or not we treat South Carolina, Virginia, or Ohio as partisan
election states, although the models reported in Table 7 do not treat them
as partisan election states.
Other results are also worth noting. Given equal crimes, available
data suggest that women tend to receive shorter sentences than men.
95
Consistent with these findings, Table 7 contains evidence that women
sentenced to death are more likely to obtain relief from their death sen-
tences than are men. Furthermore, defendants who commit capital crimes
while under sentence for other crimes and defendants who had prior mur-
der convictions are less likely to obtain relief from their capital sentences.
The explanation of why death-obtaining rates help explain case out-
comes in the BJS data but not in the state court appellate data may rest in
judicial selection method, but not in interstate differences in judicial selec-
tion method. The BJS data include grants of relief by federal courts,
whereas the state court appellate data do not. It may be that the independ-
ence of federal judges led them to be more likely to grant relief in marginal
death sentence cases than state judges. This could lead to the observed
correlation between grants of relief in the BJS data and the rates of death-
obtaining behavior. That this effect does not emerge in the state court ap-
pellate data may show that state judges know they face traditional elec-
tions or retention elections at some point in their career. More than a dec-
ade ago California's experience proved that the selection method did not
provide insulation from politicization of the death penalty. Only the life
tenure and independence of federal judges may provide the luxury of as-
sessing death penalty cases based on their death-worthiness.
But other explanations are also possible. As discussed above, possi-
bly important differences exist between the BJS data and the state court
appellate data. They cover different time periods and only the BJS data
account fully for post-conviction relief. At this point we can only suggest
95. See Kathleen Daly, Gender and Sentencing: What We Know and Don't Know from Empiri-
cal Research, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 163 (1995); Kathleen Daly & Rebecca L. Bordt, Sex Effects
and Sentencing: An Analysis of the Statistical Literature, 12 JusT. Q. 141 (1995); Michael S. Gelacak,
Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empiri-
cal and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 353 (1996) (noting downward departure
from sentencing guidelines for female white-collar offenders); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The
Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentenc-
ing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 181, 185-87 (1994).
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an explanation based on the federal judiciary's greater independence. Ex-
panding the appellate opinion database to encompass more years may yield
more conclusive evidence. For example, if we had ten years of data from
state courts, as we do for federal and state courts combined in the BJS
data, the absence of a correlation between cases' death-worthiness and
outcome would be stronger evidence of differences between state and fed-
eral court processing of capital cases.
D. ANOTHER MEASURE OF STATES' TENDENCIES TO IMPOSE
THE DEATH PENALTY
As a last effort to detect judicial selection effects, we combine Table
2's death-obtaining rates and relief rates to construct a new measure of
states' tendencies to impose the death penalty and retain it on appeal. This
measure is based on the percent of murders that led to an affirmed death
penalty. We then test whether judicial selection methods correlated with
this more sophisticated measure of death-obtaining behavior.
To illustrate, the first entry in Table 2, column five, shows that, for
1994 to 1996, 3.97% of Alabama's murders led to imposition of the death
penalty. Table 2, column eight, shows that 22.4% of death penalties in
Alabama were reversed. Conversely, 77.6% of death penalties were af-
firmed. So in a state in which 3.97% of murders led to death penalties,
77.6% of the death penalties were affirmed. We multiply the 77.6 affir-
mance rate by the 3.97 death-obtaining rate to yield an index of the percent
of murders that led to an affirmed death penalty. In Alabama's case, the
multiplication yielded 3.08%. In other words, 3.08 of each 100 murders
led to an affirmed death penalty. A similar calculation for each state al-
lows interstate comparison of a death-obtaining rate that accounts for ap-
pellate review of death sentences. Table 8 presents the results.
Table 8 confirms that states with large death rows do not necessarily
obtain and affirm death penalties at high rates. Although Nevada and
Oklahoma obtain and affirm death penalties at higher rates than other
states, their death rows were are not among the largest. California's death
row is one of the largest but its rate of obtaining and affirming death pen-
alties is one of the lowest, and is the lowest of any major death penalty
state. Texas is not extreme in its rate compared to other states. Missis-
sippi and Florida combine high trial-level death-obtaining rates with high
reversal rates to yield net death-obtaining rates that are moderate compared
to other states.
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TABLE 8. NUMBER OF AFFIRMED DEATH PENALTY CASES
PER 100 MURDERS, BY STATE, 1995-1997
State Affirmed State Affirmed
Nevada 4.75 Arizona 1.54
Oklahoma 4.48 Arkansas 1.38
North Carolina 3.85 Virginia 1.11
Alabama 3.08 Illinois 0.99
Ohio 2.67 Georgia 0.91
Pennsylvania 2.27 Louisiana 0.86
South Carolina 2.09 California 0.84
Texas 2.08 Kentucky 0.76
Mississippi 2.01 Indiana 0.75
Florida 1.89 Tennessee 0.57
Missouri 1.76
Does this new "bottom-line" measure of death-obtaining behavior
correlate with judicial selection method? Again, the answer is no. We
find no correlation between partisan elections and this measure of death-
obtaining behavior. The absence of correlation does not depend on how
South Carolina and Virginia, the two states with legislative participation in
judicial selection, are classified or on how Ohio is classified.
A possible extension of this analysis would be to account for execu-
tion rates. Affirmance of death penalties and the absence of relief do not
necessarily lead to executions. Some states have large death rows but no
or few executions. 96 The defendants are in a kind of limbo due to execu-
tive or judicial obstacles to execution. But this limbo was likely to be un-
stable overtime. We forego an execution rate analysis because of this
volatility.
E. STATE-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL PRESSURE
Neither the appellate opinion data, the BJS data, nor our new measure
of death-obtaining behavior show a robust correlation between judicial se-
96. See SNELL, supra note 56, at6, 10 tbls.5 & 10.
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lection method and treatment of death sentences. Nevertheless, California
and a few other states provide state-specific stories worth exploring.
These stories support the existence of a relation between politics and death
penalty case outcomes, even if that relation cannot be explained by focus-
ing on judicial selection method.
California combines an extremely low pre-1995 relief rate with a
merely low appellate reversal rate from 1995 to 1997. As shown in Table
2 (columns seven and eight), California's relief rate from capital sentences
was less than 1% through 1995 and increased to about 10% from 1995 to
1997 in the appellate opinion data. This is consistent with a substantial
period of extreme reluctance to overturn death sentences after Chief Jus-
tice Bird's removal in the mid-1980s, with a softening of that reluctance in
recent years. In fact, only California has a pre-1995 relief rate that statisti-
cally significantly differs from its 1995 to 1997 appellate reversal rate.
97
But even that softening left California with a low reversal rate. This con-
trasts with a more liberal reversal rate prior to the period we studied.98
Justice White's removal from office in Tennessee during the period
covered by our appellate opinion data allows us to test the hypothesis that
her removal affected that state's reversal rate. For the first two years of
the appellate data in this study, 1995 and 1996 combined, reversals oc-
curred in eight of thirteen Tennessee cases (61.5%). In 1997, the first year
after Justice White's removal, reversals occurred in one of fourteen Ten-
nessee cases (7.1%). This difference is highly statistically significant
(p=.004).99
To assess the effect of the politicization of judicial selection in South
Carolina, we added South Carolina appellate capital cases from 1981 to
1994 to the sample. Thus, for South Carolina, we have data from 1981 to
1997. As noted above, the state's attorney general, elected in 1994, ran on
strong pro-death penalty views and a politicization of the death penalty.
The attorney general's election coincided with a noticeable change in the
97. North Carolina would so differ if pre-McKoy cases were included.
98. See Uelmen, Judicial Politicization, supra note 29, at 1136.
99. This significance level is based on Fisher's exact test. The finding of a relatively high re-
versal rate for the year prior to 1996 is consistent with another study of death penalty decisionmaking
by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Professor Foley finds that, from 1990 to 1996, the Tennessee Su-
preme Court moved from a low reversal rate to a high reversal rate in capital cases. See Daniel J.
Foley, Tennessee Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis of an Ideological Shift After the 1990 Elec-
tion, 64 TENN. L. REv. 155, 169-70 (1996) (noting that the pre-1990 election court upheld the death
penalty in 92% of 12 cases; the post-1990 election court upheld the death penalty in 50% of 16 cases).
This difference is statistically significant at the .039 level. It also suggests that one who studied the
Tennessee Supreme Court before 1990 and after 1996 would observe little difference in death penalty
affirmance rates.
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success rates of South Carolina capital cases on direct appeal to the state
supreme court. From 1981 through 1993, twenty-eight of sixty-two death
penalties (45.2%) were reversed. From 1994 through 1997, five of twenty-
five death penalties (20%) were reversed. This difference is statistically
significant at the .031 level. 1' ° Even the 20% recent reversal rate may
have been artificially high because of reversals required by United States
Supreme Court decisions in South Carolina cases.
10 1
In contrast to developments in California, Tennessee, and South
Carolina, the politicization of the death penalty in the 1994 Texas Supreme
Court elections seems not to have significantly changed that state's pattern
of review in capital cases. Texas capital prisoners had little success in ob-
taining relief before 1995 and little success in obtaining appellate reversals
from 1995 to 1997. But Texas' much publicized taste for death sentences
is partly mythical. Texas' prosecutors obtain death penalties at lower rates
than at least half the states with substantial numbers of death penalties.
Similarly, Mississippi's rates of relief were not discernibly affected by the
1992 campaign against Justice Robertson. Although Mississippi continued
to grant relief to capital defendants at high rates, this may have been a
function of Mississippi's high death-obtaining rate. 12
Taken together, the state-specific stories suggest that judicial selec-
tion methods can neither insulate judges from political pressure nor always
lead to quantifiable manifestations of such pressure. California lacked
partisan judicial elections, yet justices were voted out of office on the
death penalty issue. California continued to have a fairly low reversal rate
in capital cases. Tennessee and South Carolina also supported the belief
that political pressure affects judges in capital cases. But judicial behavior
in capital cases had been politicized in Mississippi and Texas without no-
ticeable changes in their treatment of capital cases.
Whether a state is classified as having partisan judicial selection
methods is not a useful predictor of capital case outcomes. Specific state
political campaigns raising the death penalty issue are more helpful in ex-
plaining case outcomes, but even they do not always assure measurable
change.
100. This significance level is based on Fisher's exact test.
101. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.
1 (1986). See also supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the United States
Supreme Court's decision on subsequent South Carolina cases).
102. The reluctance of Pennsylvania's Supreme Court to challenge death sentences may be a
consequence of the profound effect of a criminal justice incident on a recent gubernatorial election.
See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 46. But, as Table 2 shows, Pennsylvania did not grant relief at high
rates prior to 1995.
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V. CONCLUSION
Differences in states' judicial selection methods explain little about
interstate differences in capital case outcomes. But politicization of the
death penalty issue has affected state court behavior. This seems to have
occurred in California, Tennessee, and South Carolina.
We also theorized that judicial behavior in capital cases can only be
understood if one accounts for the case selection process. 0 3 The BJS data,
but not our appellate opinion data, show a strong correlation between
states' death-obtaining behavior and reversal rates. In the BJS data, which
include federal habeas corpus capital cases, states that obtain death penal-
ties at a high rate tend to have them overturned at a high rate. This finding
is consistent with the view that high death-obtaining rates correspond to
death penalties being imposed in less death-worthy cases. Courts under-
standably overturn more capital sentences in such cases.
103. Other factors to consider include states' execution rates, remaining terms of judges, and
effects of campaign activity and financing. See Larry Aspin, Campaigns in Judicial Retention Elec-
tions: Do They Make a Difference?, 20 JUST. SYs. J. 1 (1998); Hanssen, supra note 1; Mary Libby
Payne, Mississippi Judicial Elections: A Problem Without a Solution?, 67 MiSS. LJ. 1 (1997)
(discussing cost of judicial campaigns).
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